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LAW, NORMS AND AUTHORITY. By George C Christie. London:
Duckworth. 1982. Pp. x, 181. $29.50.
In Law, Norms and Authority, Professor Christie attacks the claims of
many modem legal philosophers who, in his opinion, overstate the legitimacy of the western legal systems. According to Christie, claims that law is
normative and that authority is derived from law are not supportable, and
by spawning criticism do more to undermine than to bolster respect for law.
Christie argues that the law is better served by a frank appraisal of its true
claims to legitimacy: That authority, although defacto, rather than flowing
from, law, is nevertheless limited by the fact that those in positions of authority rely on the consent of the governed. Consequently, legal decisionmakers must behave with some degree of predictability to generate and protect the social expectations on which that consent is founded.
As the author admits, much of Law, Norms and Authority is critical, but
the criticism is not extraneous. While Christie's insights are interesting in
their own right, the justification for their inclusion is the foundation his
criticisms lay for his positive contributions to the philosphy of law.
Christie's argument that law is not normative, that it does not derive
from a set of directives that tell people what they ought to do, can be simply
stated: A theory of norms "presupposes a degree of unity, of completeness,
of purposiveness and central direction to law" (p. 175) that is simply inconsistent with the development of our law. Far from being derived from any
single source of norms, our law has grown "haphazardly and by accretion"
(p. 175). This is not to say that law does not have normative force, or that it
is incapable of guiding human behavior. Rather, the diverse and often conflicting values underlying the law as it now exists render the notion of normative consistency 1 of little use in legal decision-making.
Christie's argument for predictability follows from a model2 for legal
argumentation which he claims "permits one to make a limited claim of
objectivity for judicial decision making" (p. 81). This model rests on the
acceptance of cases and statutes as objective reference points. The cases
and statutes themselves, not including the cases' "rules of law" or the statutes' legislative histories, serve as undisputed3 premises for legal arguments.
The statutes are put on a comparable basis by presenting, for each statute, a
paradigm case - some case to which the statute certainly applies (p. 65).
Given these objective reference points, objectivity is maintained by requiring that the case in question not be decided differently from the decided
and paradigm cases, unless there exists a significant difference between the
instant case and each of the decided and paradigm cases (p. 67). The key to
1. Here, Christie is responding primarily to the works of Dworkin. Pp. 39-41. See also R.
DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977).

2. The model offered is actually a refinement of the model presented in Christie, Objectivity
YALE L.J. 1311 (1969).
3. It is undisputed in almost all situations that something either is or is not a case or a
statute. There need not be any agreement over any "rule of law" found in the case or on an
interpretation of the statute.
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maintaining objectivity in such a model is finding an objective way to define "significant difference." Christie feels that such an objective method
results when the factual circumstances of the cases, rather than any supposed underlying rules or principles, are the basis for the difference. Judicial decision-making thereby gains objectivity because "disputes about the
propriety of judicial decisions [are reduced] to disputes about the significant
factual differences among cases" (p. 69).
Christie admits that there will be cases involving factual differences
whose significance is still disputable. Although there will be leeway in decisions in such cases, there is still a requirement that there exist a "plausible
significant factual difference between [differently decided cases]" (p. 72).
Christie argues that his model parallels scientific reasoning in that both
rely on widely accepted standards to evaluate empirical evidence (p. 72).
But analogous forms ofreasoning may not guarantee the objectivity oflegal
argumentation. Various philosophers of science have questioned the objectivity of scientific theory,4 and even the possibility of neutral observation
has been challenged.5 While Christie would probably be happy with
whatever claim to objectivity science may have, his method does not reach
even that level. Science might face problems resulting from the effect of
values on seemingly neutral observations, but the problems involved in objectively selecting the significant facts from the totality of facts can only be
greater.
Quite aside from doubts about the objectivity of science, Christie's efforts to objectify the law would impose serious rigidity on the social order.
Unlike Dworkin,6 Christie does not put forward a theory of mistakes to
accommodate changes in values or in our understanding of the facts. He
thus appears to embrace "the vice known to legal theory as formalism or
conceptualism."7 Accordingly, the desire to avoid deciding unanticipated
cases has long served as the primary restraint on the desire for predictability. 8 Christie can exalt objectivity only at the expense of flexibility. True,
he would focus legal arguments on the significant differences between established results and cases at bar. But the significance of differences is best
predicted by the reasons for prior results, which Christie rejects as indeterminative. And his system of argument simply has no room for appeals to
changes in values. One wonders how many additional data points would
reconfirm the validity of Winterbottom v. Wright 9 or Plessy v. Ferguson 10 if
4. See, e.g., T. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 198 (1970) ("The
superiority of one theory to another is something that cannot be proved in . . . debate").
5. See, e.g., M. POLANYI, PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE 59-62 (1958).
6. See R. DwORKIN,supra note 1, at 118-23 (1977). Dworkin argues that the right answer
to a hard case is one that results in the best possible justification for the totality of legal results
including that of the case to be decided. An outcome consistent with the outcome of prior
cases is stronger than an outcome that is inconsistent, but in certain instances the precedent
inconsistent with the correct disposition of the case is so outmoded or unjust that the totality of
legal results can best be justified by rejecting that precedent and accepting the inconsistency.
7. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 126 (1961).
8. See H.L.A. HART, supra note 7, at 126-28; H. Hart & A. Sacks, The Legal Process:
Basic Problems in the Making and Application of Law 587-97 (unpublished manuscript 1958).
9. 153 Eng. Rep. 402 (1842).
IO. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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twentieth-century judges had relied on Christie's method. In fairness, the
reader should recognize that Christie may not have intended to advance a
comprehensive theory of judicial decision-making, including constitutional
cases and those where some precedent is directly attacked. But the cases
Christie devotes the least consideration to are precisely those where objectivity would do the most to advance the legitimacy of judicial decisionmaking.
Christie's other, and probably greater, contribution is found in his analysis of authority. He, as is common, distinguishes de jure authority, defacto
authority and "being an authority," but rejects attempts to reduce other
forms of authority to de jure authority 11 or "being an authority." 12 Instead,
he argues that "all authority is ultimately de facto" (p. 112).
Christie does not deny that a relation exists between law and authority.
By "authority," Christie means more than the power to command action;
authority also involves some claim of right that is accepted by the one to
whom the command is directed (p. 99). Particularly in the modem nationstate, where authority is not based solely on the charisma of the person in
authority, "[authority] is dependent upon law and law is dependent upon
authority" (p. 138). Perhaps neither could exist in isolation from the other;
however, "authority is the ultimate source of law rather than law being the
source of authority" (p. 139).
Law depends on authority, according to Christie, because it does not
exist in the abstract. This assertion is in a sense the touchstone of Christie's
entire argument. Since law does not exist in the abstract, it can be binding
only if promulgated by authority or backed up by sheer force (pp. 144-45).
Those in authority owe their positions to the trust of others that they will
act in accordance with some shared perception of the common good. They
must continually justify that trust by "consistently . . . trying to work out
the shared perception of what the public good requires" (p. 146).
Christie's conclusions that law is based on authority and that all authority is defacto lead to an interesting result. Christie asserts that in describing
authority it is "pointless to use the terms 'legitimate' or 'illegitimate,' " since
authority is more basic than law (p. 112). The factual existence of de facto
authority in an individual may be questioned, but there is no basis on
which to question the legitimacy of its existence.
Despite this conclusion, Christie is not prepared to allow unlimited discretion on the part of the individual in authority. "[C]laims of authority
... [and] the actual exercise of authority must ... be based upon law as
much as [they] possibly can" (p. 169). Since authority rests on consent, misuse of authority would be self-defeating.
A parallel to Christie's analysis of authority may be found in noncognitive or emotive theories of ethics. 13 Those theories grew largely out of the
11. Pp. 91-93 (discussing the theories of Peters and Winch)set'., e.g., Peters,Authority, and
Winch,Authority, both reprinted in POLlTICAL PHILOSOPHY 83, 97 (A. Quinton ed. 1967).
12. Pp. 93-94 (discussing the theory of David Bell) See, e.g., Bell, Authority 190 (Royal
Institute of Philosophy Lectures, 1969-70) (1971).
13. There are many theories that can be classified as noncognitive or emotive. The brief
presentation that follows may not be faithful to any one such theory but is an attempt to show
portions of the various theories that are analogous to the theory presented by Christie. For
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work of the Vienna Circle oflogical positivists in the 1930s. The positivists
rejected as meaningless any statements that were not either logically true or
false or empirically verifiable. Thus, any meaningful statement should be
subject to logical proof of its truth or falsity or there should be some observation that would serve to verify or falsify the claim.
Much of traditional philosophy did not meet the positivists' standard.
The statements of both metaphysics and ethics are not tautological; nor are
there observations that bear on their truth. In particular, the statements of
ethics were found to be meaningless, because goodness and wrongfulness
are not properties of acts. There is then no observation of an act that will
verify or falsify a claim that the act is either good or wrong.
Christie extends the positivists' approach to the philosophy of law. Observation and logic were basic to the positivists, and since ethical claims
could not be based on observation or logic, they were meaningless. Christie
has argued that authority, rather than any overriding system of norms, is
basic in the philosophy of law. Since authority is de facto, it admits of
observations, but legitimacy and illegitimacy in any moral sense are not
observable. Nor may a claim of legitimacy or illegitimacy rest on a legal
analysis, since authority is more basic than law.
The emotivists' attempt to find some meaning in ethical statements is
analogous to the content Christie is willing to find in claims oflegitimacy or
illegitimacy of authority. The emotivists found content in the statements of
ethics by viewing them as reports about the speaker's attitude rather than as
descriptions of the acts involved. Such reports are verifiable to the same
extent as any other self-reports of mental states and are meaningful. The
emotivists added a second element, an exhortation to others to act in accord
with the speaker's attitude, but that aspect is not necessary to a noncognitivist attempt to lend some meaning to ethical claims. Christie's view parallels this approach by allowing a claim that authority is illegitimate only if
the claim is interpreted as a statement by a person that "he does not like the
fact that a particular person . . . exercises authority and that, if he were
one of those to whom these authoritative pronouncements were addressed
he would not accept them" (p. 102).
There is, of course, criticism of noncognitive and emotive theories of
ethics. Cognitive theories argue that there are bases for ethical claims, and
that the noncognitivists have not captured the meaning of "good" or
"wrong" in their analysis. Since it does not seem contradictory for an individual to say that he sometimes approves of what is wrong, the cognitivist
concludes that ''wrong" must convey more than an attitude of disapproval.
Similarly, Christie's conclusions can be criticized for not capturing the
meaning of "legitimate."
The criticism has not proven devastating to the noncognitivist and
should be no more successful against Christie. The noncognitivist rejects
each of the offered bases for ethical claims and Christie has rejected the
bases offered for claims of legitmacy or illegitimacy of authority, since any
more insight into these ethical theories see A. AYER, LANGUAGE, TRUTH AND Lome 102-13
(2d ed. 1946); C. STEVENSON, ETHICS AND LANGUAGE (1944); Brandt, Emotive Theory ofEth•
ics, 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 493 (1967); Nielsen, History ofEthics, 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF PHILOSOPHY 81, 106-07 (1967).
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greater meaning would be based on norms that would dictate what laws a
legitimate authority could enact. But if such norms existed, law would be
normative - a conclusion Christie finds inconsistent with the haphazard
development of law.
The willingness of individuals to approve of authority that they do not
agree with may be explained as the recognition that the individual's own
attitude is sometimes at odds with what he takes to be the attitude of society
as a whole. The choices then come down to anarchy, which Christie rejects
(pp. 112-18), or accepting, in the interest of order, the authority of certain
people to serve in the role of decision-makers. 14
The reader who finds noncognitive ethical theories attractive is likely to
be similarly attracted to Christie's approach to authority and legitimacy.
The reader who rejects noncognitive ethical theories will probably reject
Christie's reduction of authority to de facto authority and his dismissal of
claims of legitimacy.

14. When the divergence between the individual's own choices and those of the authority
becomes too great, the individual can seek to replace the authority, by revolution if necessary,
or resort to civil disobedience. See pp. 138-46 (discussing the views on civil disobedience of
Dworkin and Thomas Aquinas, among others).

